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**Annual Budget
Submission**

FY-1995

MONGOLIA

AUGUST 1993



**Agency for International Development
Washington, D.C. 20523**

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MONGOLIA FY94-95 ABS

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MONGOLIA NARRATIVE STATEMENT ON BEHALF OF THE AIDREP

Introduction

Mongolia is among the 20 poorest countries in the world. Its economy currently operates at levels 30%-40% below the 1988-90 average. Industrial production is down by even greater amounts. External trade is less than one third its former levels and inflation is averaging 300% in 1993 up from 200% in 1992. Real incomes have fallen in tandem with GDP but the impact has been uneven because of the differential impact of inflation. Wage earners and pensioners on fixed incomes have been particularly hurt. Unemployment is rising and will probably continue to do so as the effects of Mongolia's massive privatization effort begin to take hold. Food and power supplies are likely to be disrupted in the coming winter threatening political unrest. All of these factors highlight the enormous pressures facing Mongolia and the fragility of its political and situation.

We have sought to keep these factors in mind as we prepared the FY1994-95 budget. We have attempted to preserve the USAID strategic objectives of supporting the economic and political transition because we believe they are strongly complementary and that failure to achieve one is likely to jeopardize the other. We believe both objectives can be pursued successfully under the 75% base budget levels but only at reduced activity levels. However, we doubt whether both strategic objectives can be pursued at the 50% base program scenario in 1995.

The economic reform movement must sustain itself over at least the next three years if the case for a market economy is to have a reasonable chance of being proven. This will be a critical period in which the transition to a market economy truly takes hold, sputters with inconclusive performance, or falls on its face. Under those circumstances we feel it would be penny wise and pound foolish to cut back the already small DA budgets.

Rapidly invigorating the emerging private is central to the ultimate success and sustainability of the Mongolian reform effort. If the private sector doesn't deliver significant results fast during the crucial 3-5 year period ahead, the opportunity to grow into its role may disappear. If the transition to a market economy fails we believe the political transition may fail.

The private sector plays the key role in whether the restructuring experiment currently underway will work and small and medium enterprises appear to be the key to whether the private sector delivers on its potential promise. The emergence of a pluralistic society is important in its own right but it is also important because it will tend to support the movement toward market liberalization. We believe our current and planned support for jump-starting the private sector and promoting small and medium enterprise development will play an important role in supporting the political transition and the move toward liberal pluralism. USAID Mongolia's emphasis on assisting the emerging private sector and the movement toward pluralism appears well-founded and constitutes a balanced, mutually supportive strategic effort.

Finally, the emergency power sector continues to be of the highest priority. We believe that failure to deal with the policy, management, and planning issues in that sector will threaten both the political and economic transition if the power goes off during the next two winters and 25% of the population is forced to move to the countryside. Failure of the power systems for less than 24 hours during the winter will essentially shut down the urban areas where 50% of the population live and is likely to cause the loss of thousands of lives and result in massive relief efforts. We should not walk away from this problem when the U.S. is in a unique position to make the difference.

We have attempted to preserve USAID Mongolia program integrity by protecting necessary staffing to implement the proposed program levels. Personnel and external USAID assistance are the prime users of any additional funding beyond the 75% OE scenarios.

Some Caveats

It needs to be emphasized that this document has been prepared by the RSM/EA and has not been seen, cleared or discussed with the Mongolian AIDREP. We have attempted to incorporate what we believe Mr. Nance's priorities to be on both the program and OE budgets but ultimately the budgets presented here are our choices not his. We did not have prior discussion with Mr. Nance on potential ABS preparation and were unable to reach him during his R&R travel for comment.

The ABS exercise for Mongolia is further complicated because the new country strategy is still under preparation and major programmatic decisions still need to be made. For all of the above reasons, this presentation suffers. Nevertheless, on the basis on our work with the AIDREP on the new country assistance strategy we can confirm that the original FY 1994 ABS strategic objectives of supporting the economic and political transition will remain valid for the new country strategy.

The programming focus presented in the original FY 1994 ABS should be taken as still generally valid although funding priorities have shifted more toward support of the political transition. A new project (narrative attached) will replace the Support for Economic Transition Project but the same strategic objective will continue to be supported. We have not submitted the standard tables or attempted to provide revised detailed breakdowns on each of the requested scenarios because the RSM/EA does not have the Mongolia FY94 ABS diskettes. However, we have provided summary tables allocating both the program and the OE budgets as instructed by E-Mail.

FY 1994 Impact - The impact of the proposed DA program cuts will fall primarily on the support for economic transition objective in FY 94 under both the 75% and 100% scenarios. We believe both programs would still be warranted and viable at the reduced levels, although less money means fewer activities. It should be noted that our proposed DA levels for supporting the political transition objective have increased in comparison with the original FY94 ABS despite the proposed budget cuts.

The proposed ESF budget scenarios of \$3.0 million and \$2.25 million represent major cuts from the originally requested level of \$15 million. The proposed ESF budgets effectively eliminate any significant capability to provide emergency spare parts and supplies. However, these amounts appear to be sufficient to provide vitally needed TA to the Mongolia energy sector. USAID energy sector TA should continue because it underpins the efforts of other donors in the sector as a whole and timing in this area is of critical urgency. On the basis of discussions with the AIDREP related to program strategy development we believe the proposed ESF budget could still play a significant role if concentrated on (i) energy supply side policy and planning issues of urgency to the sector as a whole, (ii) development of an energy sector crisis management capability in the Office of the Prime Minister, and (iii) energy demand-side management and conservation policy and planning issues. The RSM/EA believes USAID has a unique opportunity to make a significant impact on Mongolian policy and capabilities in these areas because of our consultants already in country and USAID's access to the highest political levels.

FY 1995 Impact - The impact of the proposed DA cuts in FY 1995 will fall heaviest upon the support of the economic transition objective under the 50% scenario. Although the RSM/EA believes that both strategic objectives warrant continued support, the 50% base budget scenario will severely inhibit what can be accomplished under the support for economic transition objective. Activities under the support for political transition objective will also be significantly constrained. The AIDREP may well wish to throw all funding to one strategic objective under this scenario. The 75% scenario tends to relatively favor the economic strategic objective as additional resources are added. Proposed funding for the support for political transition objective is higher under the 100% scenario than in the original FY 94 ABS despite the lower total budget.

The RSM/EA believes that amounts available under the ESF budget should be allocated to energy sector TA in the areas outlined above, regardless of the scenario. Less budget will mean less policy and planning related TA in a highly strategic area of the Mongolian economy. We believe that provision of emergency power directly supports both the economic and political transition strategic objectives and that U.S. TA can make the difference in this sector. This opinion is shared by the IMF and UNDP Reps in Ulaanbaatar.

The Current Situation

Mongolia has made good progress in its effort to transform itself from a Soviet style command economy to a market oriented economy over the last three years. Major reforms have included significant privatization, almost complete price liberalization, drafting of new foreign investment regulations, new commercial and tax codes, unification of the exchange rate, freeing of some interest rates, and the establishment of certain key institutions such as the central bank.

Mongolia's attempts at moving toward a more pluralistic society have also been highly significant, particularly given the seventy years under communist rule and the several centuries prior to that under feudal warlords. The first three elections in Mongolia's history have occurred during the last three years, with the latest in June 1993 reconfirming Mongolian commitment to move forward with its liberalization experiment.

Nevertheless, the economic and political reform task is far from complete and the transition to a pluralistic society and market economy faces a number of potential threats:

First, the socio-economic situation has significantly deteriorated since the reform movement officially got underway. Although this is largely because of the loss of Soviet aid and export markets and the disruption in Soviet import supplies, the hardships coincide with the reform process and serve to discredit it. Unless anticipated economic events over the next 2-3 years can be rapidly improved upon, reform prospects (political or economic) will remain fragile and vulnerable to reversal.

Second, Mongolians have a superficial understanding of what a market economy is and what is required to bring one about. Officials are not necessarily aware when they are taking contradictory actions nor do they understand well the role or importance of the private sector to the ultimate success of the reform effort. Evidence of these problems is seen regularly.

Third, key institutions necessary to manage a market economy tend to be embryonic, malformed, or missing. Experience in managing these institutions is virtually non-existent. Much of the recently drafted market related legislation remains to be fully implemented or needs to be reviewed and amended to achieve its original intent. Certain key legislation remains to be drafted and approved.

Fourth, old habits and bureaucratic mind-sets have died hard, tending to undermine and subvert official market-oriented policy changes in insidious ways. Government officials are used to telling people what to do and people are used to doing what they are told, regardless of the intent of new laws and policies. Thus, economic reforms tend to look better on paper than in practice.

Fifth, Mongolians do not have an entrepreneurial heritage. They lack key entrepreneurial skills, knowledge, and experience. Basic business services are generally non-existent. The private sector tends to be viewed with suspicion and entrepreneurs have little status. Yet, in the absence of a vibrant and highly responsive private sector the Mongolian economy is not likely to produce strong results fast enough to avoid calling into serious question the decision to move toward a market economy.

Sixth, failure to establish a strong private sector will tend to weaken prospects for strengthening the Mongolian middle class. Without the progressive development of a strong and relatively independent middle class the prospects for promoting liberal pluralism appear likely to diminish rapidly.

Seventh, opposition political parties remain very weak. Additional training is needed in the mechanics of party politics (membership recruitment, leadership selection and fund raising) and democracy processes (e.g., the role of an independent judiciary and legislative committees).

The Near-Term Outlook

Despite the dramatic decline in economic activity referred to above, the worst may be past. The economy is expected to bottom within the next 12-18 months at levels not too much lower than at present. Although the loss of income and export earnings are part of the continuing reality, the initial impact has largely been felt and absorbed. Similarly, although the disruption to the economy from the lack of essential Soviet spare parts and machinery imports continues to be severe, it no longer appears to be worsening in free fall fashion. Import financing remains a problem but reliability of Soviet suppliers may be stabilizing.

Economic stabilization is viewed as feasible by the IMF within about two years, assuming the Mongolian government implements the three year policy reform agenda developed with the assistance of the IMF and IBRD and adopted June 1993. The IMF projects positive economic growth by 1994 and price stabilization at single digit levels of inflation by the end of 1995 if the agenda is followed.

MONGOLIA
ECONOMIC POLICY SUPPORT PROJECT

Project Number 438-0006

A. New Project Narrative:

Mongolia is embarking upon profound political, social and economic change. As the first country to adopt Soviet-style communism in 1924 and abandon this political system in 1990, Mongolia faces several development challenges of herculean proportions. By 1990, Mongolia depended upon the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc countries for approximately 90% of its trade which was the destination for roughly 30% of Mongolia's gross national product. With the devolution of the Soviet Union into several independent, introspective and cash-strapped states, these countries precipitously ended virtually all economic assistance and drastically reduced trade with Mongolia.

Since 1990, A.I.D.'s foreign assistance program has assisted the Government of Mongolia (GOM) to shape a democratic political system and build a market-oriented economy. Mongolia's historical isolation from the West required assistance in virtually every facet of this endeavor. Since the Mongolians voted for democracy in March, 1990, the international donor community has taken an active role in this country's economic development. The World Bank has focussed on trade policy and foreign investment issues, while the Asian Development Bank has focussed on private sector participation and business regulations. The International Monetary Fund, which is applying technical assistance support to the most basic element of any macroeconomic policy reform measure, is concentrating on price stabilization activities which is comprised of monetary, fiscal, and foreign exchange policy reform interventions.

The Economic Policy Support Project (EPSP) is designed to help the GOM to create an "enabling environment" for private sector-led economic growth that (a) assists private industry (and its supporting institutions) to capitalize upon initial GOM economic reform initiatives and (b) develops the private industry's ability to participate in and contribute to Mongolia's longer-term economic development and, secondarily, policy development activities. The project may elect to focus on a specific industry program, such as small to medium-size enterprises which are historically a developing country's key to sustainable economic development.

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Recognizing past international donor economic policy reform interventions, EPSP will also enable A.I.D. to identify targets of opportunity in furthering and deepening the GOM's transition to a true market economy. Since the pace of economic policy development and implementation is usually not a constant, EPSP is designed to be responsive to the policy dialogue environment. This project will enable A.I.D. to refocus its resources where the pace of change increases or slows. This approach will help ensure complementarity with on-going reforms as well as maximize the utility of A.I.D.'s interventions.

B. Project Data

Initial Year	1994
ABS Reporting Year	1995
LOP Funding	To Be Determined
FY94 Funding	To Be Determined
PACD	September 30, 1998
Appropriation	Development Assistance and Economic Support Funds

FY 1994 & FY 1995 ABS

MONGOLIA (\$ million)

A. FY 94

DA:	@75%	Rank	@100%
Economic Policy Support Project	\$1.475	(1)0.480	\$1.925
Asia Bureau Democracy Project	\$1.000	(2)0.345	\$1.375
Subtotal	\$2.475	0.825	\$3.300

ESF:	@75%	Rank	@75%
Mongolia Energy Sector	\$2.250	0.750	\$3.000
Subtotal	\$2.250	0.750	\$3.000

B. FY 95

DA:	@50%	Rank	@75%	Rank	@100%
Economic Policy Support Project	\$0.900	(1)0.575	\$1.475	(1)0.450	\$1.925
Asia Bureau Democracy Project	\$0.750	(2)0.250	\$1.000	(2)0.375	\$1.375
Subtotal	\$1.650	0.825	\$2.475	0.825	\$3.300

ESF:	@50%	Rank	@75%	Rank	@100%
Mongolia Energy Sector Project	\$1.500	0.750	\$2.250	0.750	\$3.000
Subtotal	\$1.500	0.750	2.250	0.750	\$3.000

Principal OE Assumptions

Personnel:

1. All scenarios assume that a 2nd U.S. direct hire will be brought to post and that one dependent will accompany. No children.
2. It is assumed the AIDREP will extend for a third year, accompanied by spouse and that two children will remain in boarding school. If present AIDREP departs there will be additional travel and HH freight in FY 1994 and additional travel to post and HH freight by the new AIDREP. It is assumed additional transition costs would be offset by recruiting an AIDREP without children.
3. The 75% scenarios assume 2 US-PSCs and 5 FSNs. The 100% scenarios assume the AIDREP carries through with stated intention to add an additional US-PSC and an additional FSN-PSC and that they will be OE funded.

Housing:

1. Additional housing costs in FY94-95 reflect addition of 2nd U.S. direct hire.

Office Operations:

1. Site visits are cut to the bone in FY94 under both the 75% and 100% scenarios. This means that Ulaanbaatar will be unable to finance outside USAID assistance during FY94. Budgets are loosened in FY95 under either scenario but still lag considerably behind FY93 levels.
2. Conference travel and freight are eliminated under all scenarios.
3. Supplies are deliberately constrained under the 75% scenarios in both years.
4. Additional office space will be required for the two additional staff.
5. Communication costs are assumed to increase because of less travel by RSM/EA staff.

NXP Procurement:

1. Procurement is essentially eliminated under both 75% scenarios and marginally increased under the 100% scenarios. It is assumed the housing of the 2nd direct hire will be furnished with furniture ordered at the end of FY93.

Overall Comment: These OE budgets attempt to preserve program integrity by protecting necessary staffing to implement the proposed program levels. Personnel and external USAID assistance are the prime users of any additional funding beyond the 75% OE scenarios.

TABLE VII(a)
MONGOLIA

FY 1994 OPERATING EXPENSES

FY 1995 OPERATING EXPENSES

		FY 1994 BASE (75%)				FY 1994 TARGET (100%)				ASSUMES FY 1994 BASE FY 1995 BASE (75%)				ASSUMES FY 1994 TARGET LEVEL FY 1995 TARGET (100%)			
EXPENSE CATEGORY	FUNC CODE	OE	TF	TOTAL	UNITS	OE	TF	TOTAL	UNITS	OE	TF	TOTAL	UNITS	OE	TF	TOTAL	UNITS
U.S. DIRECT HIRE:																	
Other Salary	U106	0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0	
Education Allowances	U106	65.6		65.6		65.6		65.6		65.6		65.6		65.6		65.6	
Cost of Living Allow.	U108	0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0	
Other Benefits	U110	0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0	
Post Assign Travel	U111	6.0		6.0		6.0		6.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0	
Post Assign Freight	U112	25.0		25.0		25.0		25.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0	
Home Leave Travel	U113	8.0		8.0		8.0		8.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0	
Home Leave Freight	U114	3.0		3.0		3.0		3.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0	
Education Travel	U116	0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0	
R & R Travel	U116	0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		13.4		13.4		13.4		13.4	
Other Travel	U117	0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0	
Subtotal	U100	107.6	0.0	107.6		107.6	0.0	107.6		82.2	0.0	82.2		82.2	0.0	82.2	
F.N. DIRECT HIRE:																	
F.N. Basic Pay	U201	0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0	
Overtime/Holiday Pay	U202	0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0	
Other Code 11 - FN	U203	0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0	
Other Code 12 - FN	U204	0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0	
Benefits - Former FN	U205	0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0	
Accrued Severance	U206	0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0	
Subtotal	U200	0.0	0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0	0.0	
CONTRACT PERSONNEL:																	
U.S. PSC - S&B	U302	63.0		63.0		113.0		113.0		65.0		65.0		90.0		90.0	
Other U.S. PSC Costs	U303	0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0	
FN PSC - S&B	U304	14.0		14.0		20.0		20.0		15.0		15.0		20.0		20.0	
Other FN PSC Costs	U305	0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0	
Manpower Contracts	U306	0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0	
Accrued Severance	U307	5.0		5.0		7.0		7.0		10.0		10.0		13.0		13.0	
Subtotal	U300	82.0	0.0	82.0		140.0	0.0	140.0		90.0	0.0	90.0		123.0	0.0	123.0	
HOUSING:																	
Residential Rent	U401	17.0		17.0		17.0		17.0		18.0		18.0		18.0		18.0	
Residential Utilities	U402	1.5		1.5		1.5		1.5		1.7		1.7		1.7		1.7	
Maint/Repairs	U403	3.0		3.0		3.0		3.0		3.0		3.0		3.0		3.0	
Living Quarters Allow	U404	0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0	
Security Guards	U407	0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0	
Official Res. Exp.	U408	0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0	
Representation Allow.	U409	0.6		0.6		0.6		0.6		0.6		0.6		0.6		0.6	
Subtotal	U400	22.1	0.0	22.1		22.1	0.0	22.1		23.3	0.0	23.3		23.3	0.0	23.3	

TABLE VII(a)
MONGOLIA

FY 1994 OPERATING EXPENSES

FY 1995 OPERATING EXPENSES

EXPENSE CATEGORY	FUNC CODE	FY 1994 BASE (75%)				FY 1994 TARGET (100%)				ASSUMES FY 1994 BASE FY 1995 BASE (75%)				ASSUMES FY 1994 TARGET LEVEL FY 1995 TARGET (100%)			
		OE	TF	TOTAL	UNITS	OE	TF	TOTAL	UNITS	OE	TF	TOTAL	UNITS	OE	TF	TOTAL	UNITS
OFFICE OPERATIONS:																	
Office Rent	U501	3.6		3.6		7.6		7.6		3.7		3.7		7.7		7.7	
Office Utilities	U502	1.0		1.0		1.0		1.0		1.0		1.0		1.0		1.0	
Building Maint/Repair	U503	1.0		1.0		1.0		1.0		1.0		1.0		1.0		1.0	
Equip. Maint/Repair	U508	0.6		0.6		0.6		0.6		0.6		0.6		0.6		0.6	
Communications	U509	8.0		8.0		7.0		7.0		7.0		7.0		7.0		7.0	
Security Guards	U510	2.2		2.2		2.2		2.2		2.3		2.3		2.3		2.3	
Printing	U511	0.2		0.2		0.2		0.2		0.2		0.2		0.2		0.2	
Site Visits - Mission	U513	5.0		5.0		20.0		20.0		20.0		20.0		28.0		28.0	
Site Visits - AIC/W	U514	0.0		0.0		6.0		6.0		0.0		0.0		8.0		8.0	
Information Meetings	U516	0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0	
Training Travel	U516	0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0	
Conference Travel	U517	0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0	
Other Operational Trvl	U518	0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0	
Supplies	U519	10.0		10.0		16.0		16.0		11.0		11.0		16.0		16.0	
FAAS	U520	0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0	
Consultant Contacts	U521	0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0	
Mgmt/Prof Svcs Cont	U522	0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0	
Spec. Studies/Analyses	U523	0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0	
ADP H/W Lease/Maint	U525	0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0	
ADP S/W Lease/Maint	U526	0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0	
Trans/Freight - U500	U598	0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0	
Other Contract Svcs	U599	46.0		46.0		46.0		46.0		47.0		47.0		47.0		47.0	
Subtotal	U500	77.6	0.0	77.6		107.6	0.0	107.6		93.8	0.0	93.8		118.8	0.0	118.8	
NXP PROCUREMENT:																	
Vehicles	U601	0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0	
Residential Furniture	U602	0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0	
Residential Equipment	U603	0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0	
Office Furniture	U604	0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		3.0		3.0	
Office Equipment	U605	0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		3.4		3.4	
Other Equipment	U606	0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0		0.0	
ADP H/W Purchases	U607	0.0		0.0		6.0		6.0		0.0		0.0		6.0		6.0	
ADP S/W Purchases	U608	0.0		0.0		1.4		1.4		0.0		0.0		1.4		1.4	
Trans/Freight - U600	U698	0.0		0.0		1.0		1.0		0.0		0.0		1.8		1.8	
Subtotal	U600	0.0	0.0	0.0		8.4	0.0	8.4		0.0	0.0	0.0		15.6	0.0	15.6	
TOTAL OE BUDGET		289.3	0.0	289.3		385.7	0.0	385.7		289.3	0.0	289.3		362.9	0.0	362.9	
Less FAAS	U520	0.0	0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0	0.0	
TOTAL OE BUDGET		289.3	0.0	289.3		385.7	0.0	385.7		289.3	0.0	289.3		362.9	0.0	362.9	
636(c)	U999			0.0				0.0				0.0				0.0	22.8
GRAND TOTAL OE BUDGET		289.3	0.0	289.3		385.7	0.0	385.7		289.3	0.0	289.3		362.9	0.0	362.9	

USDH FTEs
 FNDH FTEs
 US PSC FTEs
 TCN PSC FTEs
 FN PSC FTEs
 OTHER CONTRACT FTEs

ANNUAL BUDGET SUBMISSION, FY - 1995 :	PD-ABK-270
MONGOLIA	1 OF 1 (24X)
MONGOLIA	1993
ANNUAL BUDGET SUBMISSION (ABS)	